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I. INTRODUCTION
“[I’m] sure this occasion must be as gratifying to you as it is to me
and to the rest of us. . . . You’ve watched [television] come from the cradle
and learn to creep, and today, I’m glad to say, marks a new epoch in the new
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development of this child.”1 On July 7, 1936, Radio Corporation of America
(“RCA”), and the National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) commenced the
first public demonstration of television broadcasting with this message.2 Now
just a relic, the contents of this radio wave transmission were once considered
valuable intellectual property that belonged to RCA and NBC as copyrighted
material.3
At the time of the original transmission, the owners of this
broadcasted material owned various rights in the work; by today’s standards,
they would own the right to publically perform the copyrighted work.4
However, at the time of this transmission, the world did not yet know of the
videocassette recorder, a digital video recorder, or the Internet.5 Although
early on access to the broadcasted content was free, access was only
achievable by those owning an antenna placed in such a way as to receive the
clear signal.6 But the world of broadcasting has changed incredibly since the
world first was graced with television.7 Instead of being required to own an
antenna to acquire access to a signal transmitted by a broadcasting network,
the consumer has the ability to gain access by other means.8 Further, this
access is supplemented by the ability to time-shift and place-shift the content,
providing consumers with a more user-friendly experience.9
The
broadcasting network is no longer in exclusive control of when or even how
the viewer can access or receive the content, and this has given rise to
significant issues in the area of copyright law, most notably violations of
public performance rights.10 These developing methods of accessing content
1
Historycomestolife, First Television Broadcast NBC/RCA July 7, 1936 Part 1 of 2, YOUTUBE (Jan.
28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6iWJ5LObN2o.
2
Early Electronic Television, EARLY TELEVISION MUSEUM, http://www.earlytelevision.org/rca_fiel
d_trls.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
3
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-303, 37 Stat. 488; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09 (2015). Motion pictures, although not expressly included in the
Copyright Act of 1909, was later added to sections 5(l) and (m) of the Act. Id.
4
1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075; 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012).
5
See generally Elisha Hartwig, Tech Time Machine: TV and Media Consumption, MASHABLE, http://
mashable.com/2015/01/04/tv-media-tech-ces/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
6
Aditya Pisharody, The Future of Television: Will Broadcast and Cable Television Networks Survive
the Emergence of Online Streaming? (May 2013) (unpublished B.S. thesis, New York University) (on file
with the University of Dayton Law Review).
7
See generally Historical Periods in Television Technology, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
transition.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
8
See The Opportunities and Threats from Next Generation Television, PAC. TELEVISION COUNCIL 1,
1 (2012), http://www.ptc.org/ptc12/images/papers/upload/PTC12_T6_Rob%20Frieden%20%28Paper%2
9.pdf.
9
Id.; Mark Huffman, More Consumers are Getting Their TV from the Internet, CONSUMERAFFAIRS
(Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/more-consumers-are-getting-their-tv-from-the-int
ernet-042514.html.
10
Andrew Fraser, Note, Television A La Carte: American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo and How
Federal Courts’ Interpretations of Copyright Law are Impacting the Future of the Medium, 20 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 132, 136 (2014) (“Consumers primarily used [the VCR] for ‘time-shifting’ purposes, meaning
that they would record a program in order to view it at a later time.”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984) (noting that the time-shifting capabilities of the
VCR implicate public performance rights under copyright law, and they came under scrutiny by the
Supreme Court in the mid 1980’s).
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have shown consumers that their viewing options are increasingly
customizable, and that cable and satellite providers may not be in their favor.
The specific problem this Comment addresses is the juxtaposition
between rapidly innovative broadcasting technology and the relatively static
nature of the relevant copyright laws concerning compulsory broadcast
licenses. While innovative methods of broadcast television begin to emerge
in an established content distribution market, the laws regarding base
compensation for broadcasting copyrighted material remain stagnant.11 In
order to avoid taking two steps backward regarding innovative television
broadcast methods, it is time to revisit the 1976 Copyright Act and reconstruct
the language of broadcast compulsory licenses in a way that is mutually
beneficial to both the copyright owners and the companies hoping to establish
themselves in a developed market.
Part II illustrates and explains the exclusive rights granted to the
broadcasting companies as copyright owners by providing a brief synopsis
pertaining to the historical development and use of compulsory licenses in
copyright. Further, this Part gives an overview of the case law landscape
surrounding broadcast transmission and copyright licensing, and defines
precisely what the problem is with the recent holding of the Supreme Court.
Part III of this Comment analyzes the current linguistic structure of
copyright compulsory licenses concerning television broadcasting, and
asserts that while the use of compulsory licenses remains necessary to
encourage innovation with minimal risk while simultaneously protecting the
rights of authors, the current statutory language fails at supporting innovative
broadcasting technologies, and therefore requires a revision to remain
consistent with the objective of copyright law. The current licensing structure
hinders innovation by excluding unaccounted for technologies, like Internet
broadcasting and other future technological developments on the horizon.
This change in television broadcasting and the implementation of streaming
television is founded on a single concept; the viewer wants control over their
content.12 Re-categorizing the compulsory licensing schemes to reflect this
change will invite innovative broadcasting technologies and methods, while
providing just compensation to copyright owners for the use of their works
no matter the content delivery system. In order to accomplish these ends, the
11
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014) (ruling that retransmission of
television broadcasts over the Internet without authorization from the copyright owners violated their
public performance rights, and is an infringing activity). Subsequent to this ruling, Aereo was denied a
compulsory license because it did not meet the statutory definition of a cable company and was forced to
cease operating completely. See Megan Geuss, Aereo Puts Operations on Hold, Refunds Customers Last
Paid Month, ARS TECHNICA (June 28, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/aereoputs-operations-on-hold-refunds-customers-last-paid-month/.
12
Merrill Barr, 2013 is Television’s Most Innovative Year in Decades, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013, 9:13
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillbarr/2013/12/02/2013-is-televisions-most-inavative-year-in-dec
ades/.
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current statutory licenses must be reformed to account for both existing and
future methods of broadcasting.
II. BACKGROUND
Compulsory licensing pertaining to television broadcasting is narrow,
despite the many complex concepts at work. This Part first describes the
sections of the 1976 Copyright Act that are of significant relevance. Then,
this Part examines the historical development and implementation of
compulsory licenses throughout the history of copyright law, as well as the
events leading to the licenses currently in effect. Next, this Part will provide
a snapshot of the recent landscape of judicial input regarding copyright law,
public performance rights, and the strict boundaries of the compulsory
licenses for broadcast television. Finally, this Part will illustrate the problem
regarding recent court holdings and the future of television broadcasting.
A. Relevant Parts of the Copyright Act of 1976
Enacted in 1976, the Copyright Act serves “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”13 Within the various
sections, the Act provides legal protection for numerous forms of creative and
artistic works of authorship bearing a low modicum of creativity, however
basic or complex.14 The Act furthers the progress of useful arts by granting
authors exclusive rights to exploit the economical fruits of their creativity.
Among these rights, is the right of public performance, which is granted to
the creators of audiovisual works.
1. Exclusive Right of Public Performance
The content of a single broadcasted channel falls into the definition
of an audiovisual work, and is thus the type of subject matter protected under
the 1976 Copyright Act.15 The owners of that content, in this case the
broadcasting companies, enjoy certain exclusive rights in their work. 16
Among others, the owners of audiovisual works enjoy the exclusive right of
public performance, and have a cause of action for infringement against those
publically performing their works.17 This right of public performance
contemplates the owners’ ability to disseminate their works of authorship to
the public, who, having no rights in the content itself, can freely enjoy it.18
However, when an entity collects and redistributes the same content for profit,
13
14
15
16
17
18

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Id. §§ 101, 102(a)(6).
Id. § 106.
Id. §§ 106(4), 501(b).
Id. § 101.
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it gives rise to a copyright infringement cause of action.19 Specifically, a
secondary retransmission of content over a cable or satellite system without
proper authorization is considered a violation of an author or owner’s public
performance rights.20
2. Copyright Infringement
When a third party violates any of the exclusive rights granted to
copyright owners under the 1976 Copyright Act, that person or entity has
infringed the rights of the copyright owner.21 This violation provides the
copyright owner with a cause of action against the infringing party for either
direct or indirect infringement, depending on the nature of the violation.22
However, that third party may be able to exercise, on a limited basis, some of
the exclusive rights of a copyright owner by seeking permission from the
copyright owner. Generally, this is obtained through some form of licensing
agreement that grants the licensee limited or unlimited rights to exercise some
or all of the exclusive rights for a limited or unlimited time in either a limited
or unlimited geographical scope. Those details, usually decided through the
course of negotiation, are up to the parties to decide. But undertaking the
sometimes daunting task of private license negotiations may not be
economically feasible for smaller license-seeking parties.23 Alternatively, the
potential licensee can seek to utilize a statutory, or compulsory license.24
B. Historical Development of Compulsory Licenses
A compulsory license is an arrangement provided by the 1976
Copyright Act that “requires an owner of a copyrighted work to permit any
person use of the copyrighted work for an established fee.”25 By operation, a
copyright owner is compelled to license their work at a rate stipulated by the
language set forth in the 1976 Act.26 Today, there are several provisions in
the 1976 Act that provide compulsory licenses for various types of works of
authorship.27 However, this was not always the case. The compulsory
Id. § 501(b).
Id. § 501(c)–(e).
Id. § 501(a).
22
Id. § 501(b).
23
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976) (“[I]t would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require
every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable
system.”).
24
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119.
25
Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Blacked-Out Professional Team Sporting Event Telecasts
(PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 410
(1995) (internal citation omitted) (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 51–52 (1991)).
26
Id. at 410.
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (secondary retransmission of broadcast cable television); id. § 115 (making
and distribution of phonorecords); id. § 116 (public performance of musical compositions on jukeboxes);
id. § 118 (use of music and works of art on public broadcasting); id. § 119 (satellite transmission for private
home viewing).
19
20
21
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licenses were developed over time as more innovative technologies developed
and evolved to take the shape in which they exist today.
The first compulsory license was adopted in 1909 in response to
exclusive licensing agreements held between music publishers and
manufacturers of player piano rolls.28 Composers of music brought claims of
equity in court to enjoin producers of mechanical music rolls for use in
connection with a player piano.29 The Supreme Court held that “[the]
perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly applied and properly
operated in connection with the mechanism to which they are adapted,
produce musical tones in harmonious combination. But we cannot think that
they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act.”30 This holding
permitted manufacturers of mechanical reproductions of musical
compilations to profit off of the reproduction of the music without being
bound to any licensing agreement, so long as the reproduction was mechanical
in nature. Congress, in response, negated this holding by adopting the
Copyright Act of 1909, effectively providing compensation to the musical
composers for the mechanical reproduction of their compositions.31
As time progressed, new technologies gave birth to similar issues.
The broadcasting and recording technology and development expanded the
ways in which people could enjoy musical and audiovisual compositions.32
Authors became increasingly frustrated by radio broadcast stations
performing their compositions without receiving any form of payment
whatsoever.33 Radio broadcasters were enjoying the benefit of disseminating
music without paying for it. The 1909 Copyright Act did not contain any
protection for musical performances, and so the musical composers had little,
if any, authority to request payment for playing their music over the air.34
This same problem was replicated in the growing television broadcast
industry. Many cable television systems were engaging in broadcast
retransmissions of distant television signals without compensating the
broadcasting company or the copyright owner.35 Copyright owners of the
broadcasted content began to utilize the court system to attack cable television
retransmission as infringing public performance under the 1909 Copyright
28
Fisch, supra note 25, at 418 (internal citations omitted); see also White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
29
White-Smith Music Publ’g Co., 209 U.S. at 18. Musical rolls that were manufactured and produced
for use in connection with machines able to reproduce the musical compilations were not copies for the
sake of the 1909 Copyright Act, and the manufacture thereof could not be enjoined by copyright law,
therefore, the music rolls were not infringing copyrights owned by the musical composers. Id.
30
Id.
31
Dan Garon, Note, Poison ivi: Compulsory Licensing and the Future of Internet Television, 39 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 173, 179–80 (2013).
32
Id. at 180.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 181.
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Act.36 Much like in 1908, when the Court was unconvinced that the music
roll for the piano was a copy,37 the Court in the 1960’s was also unconvinced
that cable broadcast retransmission systems were violating performance
rights, and rejected the copyright owner’s attempt to assert their rights.38
Despite the failure in the courts, the copyright owners were not without
options.
By 1966, the broadcasters had convinced the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) to create rules restricting cable
television broadcast retransmission.39
Recognizing the growing tension between broadcasters and cable
companies, Congress sought to bring the actions of cable companies within
the borders of copyright law.40 In doing so, Congress essentially did three
things: (1) declared cable television retransmission a public performance of
copyrighted work by enacting the Transmit Clause; (2) established a
compulsory license scheme for rebroadcasted television; and (3) expressly
defined what constitutes a cable system.41 This revision of the copyright law
effectively eliminated the Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions and
established rules that served to protect the interest of broadcasters and
copyright owners.42
The use of compulsory licenses to protect both the interests of the
copyright owner, as well as those hoping to utilize the copyrighted work to
generate revenue is not a novel concept. Their development has taken shape
over the course of 100 years and serves “as [an] interim arrangement[] to
preserve a balance between the extremes of full and no liability during periods
of technological or other change.”43 However, one of the primary concerns is
that while “copyright law continue[s] to develop alongside technology, . . . [it
is] not developing quickly enough.”44
C. Recent Developments – Broadcasting Without a License
The current landscape of case law pertaining specifically to Internet
television broadcast and public performance rights is relatively novel, with
Id.
White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908).
Teleprompter Corp. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 409 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400–02 (1968); Garon, supra note 31, at 182.
39
Garon, supra note 31, at 182. These promulgated rules became effective in 1972 and imposed
requirements for cable providers that effectively prevented cable companies from directly competing with
broadcasters. Id.
40
Id.
41
See id. at 182–83.
42
Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 409; Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. at 400–01; Tim Warnock,
Feature Story: What’s in the Middle of an Aereo? Technology Versus the Copyright Act, 50 TENN. B.J. 22,
24 (2014); see also Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504–05 (2014).
43
Michael Botein & Edward Samuels, Compulsory Licenses in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A
Workable Solution?, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 69, 70 (2005).
44
Amanda Asaro, Comment, Stay Tuned: Whether Cloud-Based Service Providers Can Have Their
Copyrighted Cake and Eat It Too, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2014) (citing Kurt E. Kruckeberg,
Copyright “Band-Aids” and the Future of Reform, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1545, 1546–50 (2011)).
36
37
38
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many of the cases being decided within the last five years.45 This is partially
because the Internet itself is still infantile in comparison; other content
delivery systems have been established for many years. But, the ability to
access broadcast television online is becoming easier due to faster Internet
speeds and this is breathing life back into the conversation.46 Entrepreneurs
with an eye toward the future of television, and the consumers’ demand to
reduce monthly household costs are driving this change.47 The effect of
increased Internet television broadcasting has impacted revenue generated by
advertising efforts on the cable and satellite networks, and is forcing parties
to the courtrooms to protect their business interests.48 The plaintiffs in these
cases are ultimately alleging copyright infringement, specifically through the
operation of the Transmit Clause and the right of public performance.
Primarily two Circuits have faced these issues, but seemingly have
been on different channels. While the Second Circuit found that Internet
broadcast television, operating in a specific way, is not a public performance,
the Ninth Circuit established exactly the opposite, even after considering the
argument, discussion, and rationale conducted in the Second Circuit.49 Due
to the circuit split, the Supreme Court was recently called upon to determine
to what extent, if any, does Internet broadcasting infringe authors’ public
performance rights, and ultimately agreed with the Ninth Circuit, and cut the
power to Internet broadcast television. The issues in these cases generally
turn on their respective interpretations of what it means to perform publically,
another’s copyrighted work.
1. Circuit Split – Second and Ninth Circuits
In American Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo I”),
broadcasting companies collectively filed claims against an Internet
broadcasting company by the name of Aereo for copyright infringement.50
“Aereo’s system [provided] . . . access [to] free, over-the-air broadcast
television through [small] antennas and hard [drive storage] . . . .”51 A
45
See, e.g., Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498; WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012); Fox
Television Stations v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
46
See Huffman, supra note 9. Roughly one-third of consumers in the United States live in Internetconnected households that permit them to stream content through their television. Id.
47
Mark Glaser, Your Guide to Cutting the Cord to Cable TV, MEDIASHIFT (Feb. 21, 2012), http://medi
ashift.org/2012/02/your-guide-to-cutting-the-cord-to-cable-tv-updated-2012-edition052/.
48
Amadou Diallo, Cable TV Model Not Just Unpopular But Unsustainable, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2013,
9:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2013/10/14/cable-tv-price-hikes-unsustainable/.
49
Compare ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying
preliminary injunctive relief to prevent Aereo’s Internet broadcast television model from continuing to
operate), and WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming the
denial for preliminary injunctive relief in Aereo I), and Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,
536 F.3d 121, 136–40 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding transmission from a digital video recorder to a subscriber
did not constitute a public performance), with Fox Television Stations, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1143 (holding
Internet broadcast television without proper authorization to be a public performance).
50
874 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
51
Id. at 376–77.
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subscriber using their service can either watch the content live or record it for
later viewing, and can even use basic video control functions such as pause
and rewind.52 When a subscriber conducts either of these activities, they are
doing so through a single antenna personally assigned to their account, which
is used to isolate the content and provide it to the subscriber.53 Since Aereo
and its subscribers were conducting these activities without the proper
authorization, the broadcasting companies filed suit alleging that their
operation specifically infringed their right of public performance.54
The broadcasting companies, attempting to protect the integrity of
their copyrighted works, filed a motion for preliminary injunction against
Aereo to cease their operation.55 The court was forced to determine the
likelihood of success on the merits of the broadcasting companies’
infringement claim.56 The case would ultimately turn on whether or not
Aereo’s performance was considered a public or a private performance of the
broadcasting companies’ works.57 Utilizing the precedent set in Cartoon
Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,58 the court reasoned that Aereo’s
antennas receiving a single signal and transmitting that signal to a single
subscriber could not constitute a public performance, and denied the motion
for a preliminary injunction.59 This decision was affirmed on appeal, relying
again on CSC Holdings, Inc.’s rationale.60
Subsequently, in Fox Television Stations v. BarryDriller Content
Systems, Fox Television Stations, and many other broadcasting companies,
brought claims of copyright infringement against various Internet television
service providers.61 After filing a motion for preliminary injunction, the court
was called upon to consider the likelihood that Fox TV Stations and the other
plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their infringement claim against
BarryDriller.62 BarryDriller did not deny the fact that they retransmitted the
content owned by the plaintiffs. Instead, they argued that it was analogous to
Aereo’s conduct, which at that time, was non-infringing.63 Like in Aereo I,
the outcome of this case turned upon the concept of public performance.64
The court discussed at length the Second Circuit’s reasoning for determining
Aereo’s service as lawful.65 The opinion summarizes that the Southern
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 377.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 395–96.
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Aereo II, 712 F.3d 676, 696 (2d Cir. 2013).
915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1140–41.
Id. at 1143–46.
Id.
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District of New York applied the analysis in CSC Holdings, Inc. “to find that
a service that assigned each user a unique antenna, allowing each user to
watch over the internet live or recorded television broadcasts received by the
user’s . . . antenna, did not infringe the copyright holder’s right of public
performance.”66 However, the court in Fox Television Stations found this
argument unpersuasive, as the Second Circuit’s precedent is not binding on
the Ninth Circuit.67 As a result, the court found that Fox TV Stations, Inc. and
the other broadcast companies showed a likelihood of success on the merits
of their copyright infringement claim, and issued the preliminary injunction
against BarryDriller and the other Internet broadcast companies.68
Unauthorized Internet broadcast television in the Ninth Circuit was
effectively shut down.
2. Supreme Court – American Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent decision in American
Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo III”) has seemingly
resolved the circuit split between the Second and Ninth Circuits over the
issues of whether Internet broadcasting companies were infringing the
authors’ right of public performance, and whether they were acting like a
cable company, entitling them to a compulsory license under section 111.69
The Court assimilated Aereo’s operation to that of the early community
access television providers that gained popularity in the 1950’s, which
eventually served the communities as the first cable providers.70 Despite this
description, the Court refused to opine whether Aereo would fit the statutory
definition of a cable system, which would entitle them to a compulsory
license.71 However, the Court did decide that Aereo’s actions constituted a
public performance, and were infringing those rights owned collectively by
the broadcasting companies.72
In sum, the current landscape of copyright recognizes that Internet
broadcasting companies are at least somewhat different from existing cable
and satellite network providers. But what they should recognize is that this
difference is fundamental, and significant enough to warrant a deeper
inspection. While they do provide the consumer with a public performance
of a copyrighted work, that public performance is at the request of the
consumer’s input, much like in Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network, LLC.73
Currently, the compulsory licensing scheme in place blocks Internet
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1145; 536 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).
915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
Id. at 1146–48.
134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014).
Id. at 2506.
Id. at 2512–13.
Id. at 2511.
747 F.3d 1060, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2014).
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broadcasting from accessing and transmitting content that established systems
readily have access to, and have had access to since the revision of the
Copyright Act in 1976. In doing so, the 1976 Act is thwarting this innovative
technology rather than promoting the progress of the sciences and useful arts.
D. The Problem – New Methods of Broadcasting
As broadcasting begins to take on a different form, new companies
are popping up that seek to provide consumers with a new option for receiving
television content through the Internet.74 This new form of competition is
causing cable networks and satellite broadcasting providers to alter their
business models, which benefits the consumer by providing more choices
about how to access their entertainment. However, because these newer
models are cheaper, and equally as efficient, it is causing the broadcasting
companies to lose negotiating power in licensing transactions. Since Internet
broadcasting companies are forced to either negotiate private licenses, or
infringe, many just simply do not have the ability to compete with established
content providing services, and avoid doing so. This effect in reality harms
the consumer because this option is no longer available.
III. ANALYSIS
Compulsory licenses provide a benefit to developing service
providers that are not financially stable enough to conduct private
negotiations.75 Despite increased skepticism about the extent of these
benefits, compulsory licenses remain imperative to the development of
alternative broadcasting methods. Compulsory license schemes remain
necessary to harness innovation, but the current statutory language fails at
supporting innovative broadcasting technologies, therefore requiring revision
to remain consistent with the objective of copyright law. Since the narrowly
drafted provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act pertaining to broadcast
compulsory licenses lack any reference to Internet broadcasting, the relevant
sections have become relatively ineffective. As such, the format of the
broadcasting compulsory license ought to be amended in such a way that
broadens the scope to encourage innovation.

74
Bryant McBride, The Future of Broadcast Television, MEDIADAILYNEWS (Dec. 30, 2014, 7:00
AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/240772/the-future-of-broadcast-television.html. It
is predicted that in year 2015 and onward, traditional cable and satellite providers will have to consider
offering over-the-top viewing options to their subscribers in order to remain relevant in the content
distribution market, and to compete with providers such as Netflix and Hulu. Id.
75
Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 191,
202–03 (1990) (“[F]ree market negotiations between broadcasters and cable operators would result in
unfairly costly copyright licenses, or in no licenses at all.”). Negotiating licenses on a signal-by-signal
basis would not be conducive to the industry development because it would not be cost effective. Id. (citing
Leslie A. Swackhamer, Cable-Copyright: The Corruption of Consensus, 6 COMM./ENT. L.J. 283, 295
(1983)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976).
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A. Broadcast Compulsory Licenses Remain Relevant
The use of compulsory licenses remains to be an important and
beneficial part of the 1976 Copyright Act. In recent years, there has been
plenty of commentary from legal scholars suggesting that Congress abandon
the compulsory license statutes in the 1976 Act.76 One of the primary
arguments for abandoning the use of compulsory licenses is that they have
been rendered obsolete by the increased sophistication and private
negotiations taking place between service providers and content providers.77
However, the variety of service providers has evolved and introduced a new
format previously unknown––Internet broadcasting. While compulsory
licenses may not be necessary anymore with respect to cable and satellite
companies, continued use of compulsory licenses will continue to benefit
Internet broadcasting service providers, as well as other innovative content
delivery systems.
1. The Initial Rationale for Implementing Compulsory Licenses
The initial rationales for implementing a statutory copyright license
are still valid in today’s marketplace. These rationales consisted of: (a)
mitigating monopolistic behavior and favoritism; (b) easing the burden
between content and services providers to conduct private negotiations, and
providing them with a baseline for compensation; (c) engaging in dispute
resolution; and (d) aiding underdeveloped companies in establishing their
presence in a market.78 Critics would suggest that these rationales are no
longer prevalent,79 but Internet broadcasting television is a primary example
of why compulsory licenses are important.
a. Mitigating Monopolistic Behavior
One of the first cases to discuss the concept of compulsory licenses
is Standard Music Roll Co. v. Mills, which was decided in 1917.80 This case
discussed statutory royalties, provided by the Copyright Act of 1909,
pertaining to reproduction of mechanical music rolls for player pianos. In the
rather brief discussion about licenses, the Third Circuit stated:
The object of these provisos seems to be the prevention of
monopoly or favoritism in granting the right to reproduce a
musical work mechanically. If the owner authorize[s] one
76
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 305; Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Good-Bye to
Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 308–09 (2001).
77
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 306.
78
Fisch, supra note 25, at 417 (citing Robert Cassler, Copyright Compulsory Licenses—Are They
Coming or Going?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 231, 232–35 (1990)); see also Botein & Samuels, supra
note 43, at 70 n.3.
79
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 284.
80
See generally 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
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person to reproduce the work mechanically, other persons
also may reproduce it in a similar mechanical manner, subject
to the payment of the statutory royalty.81
By implementing a statutorily enforced payment to a copyright owner,
Congress gave those wishing to exploit the copyrighted work for profit a form
of protection against infringement claims and encouraged the copyright
owner to provide its works of art to the public through competitive means for
compensation.82
The statutorily enforced payments allowed content
providers to compete in a market that they would not have otherwise had the
opportunity to do so within the confines of copyright law.83
In the beginning, television broadcasters supported the concept of
community access television because it provided a larger audience and
permitted them to increase their revenue.84 However, as the trend continued
to grow, service providers began importing signals from distant transmitters
without compensating the content providers.85 In Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc., the Supreme Court concluded that passive
retransmission of local signals did not constitute infringement under the 1909
Copyright Act, and therefore cable companies were not legally liable.86 This
finding seemingly halted the growth and development of the broadcasting
industry since copyright owners were afforded no protection against the
unauthorized dissemination of their works of art.87 The copyright owners
effectively put a tighter grip around the bundle of rights pertaining to their
works in order to prevent others from using them. Recognizing the trouble
this could cause to the development of the industry, the Cabinet Committee
on Cable Television, producers, syndicators, broadcasters, and cable
operators reluctantly reached a compromise that established the current
compulsory licensing system.88 This compromise not only established the
unauthorized broadcasting of copyrighted works as an infringing act,89 but it
continued to prevent the broadcasting companies from exclusively licensing
their content to a select few.90 This benefitted the consumer by providing
more than just a couple of limited options.
b. Easing the Burden Between Content and Service Providers
In 1976 the Copyright Act was revised, and Congress included
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 363; Cassler, supra note 78, at 252; see also Fisch, supra note 25, at 417.
Garon, supra note 31, at 175.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 183–84.
392 U.S. 390, 400 (1968); see also Cate, supra note 75, at 199.
Cate, supra note 75, at 199.
Id.
Id. at 202.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
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various compulsory licenses for different types of copyrighted works. 91
Specifically pertaining to broadcasting, this ultimately came as a response to
the development of competing interests between service providers and
content providers.92 Prior to the copyright law revisions, televisionbroadcasting networks sought to establish that unauthorized transmission of
copyrighted works constituted copyright infringement.93 The judiciary did
not agree.
In enacting the compulsory license statutes, with respect to cable
companies, Congress stated that “it would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright
owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.”94 Congress
recognized the parties’ interrelation––a developed broadcasting network
owning banks of copyrighted works, on the one hand, and an unsophisticated
content delivery system still in its infancy on the other.95 In order to continue
the development of this enterprise, Congress provided some middle ground
through the licensing statutes to serve as a starting point for licensing
copyrighted works. This middle ground proved to be a significantly
beneficial aspect in the continued development of the cable broadcast
industry.
c. Dispute Resolution
Compulsory licenses helped resolve disputes involving infringement
for delivering content without authorization, while bringing sought-after
content to the consumer. Just prior to the adoption of the Copyright Act of
1976, broadcasters and copyright owners of audiovisual works sought to
enjoin cable companies from broadcast retransmission, but ultimately failed
to convince the judiciary to do so.96 This attempt to seek legal protection was
illustrative of the conflict between cable companies and content providers that
had existed since the 1950’s and the rising trend of broadcasted works.
Without the legal protection of their works, cable companies were permitted
to retransmit broadcast television for free, disincentivizing the copyright
owners from continuing to create works. The parties were not under any
obligation to establish licenses or pay any fees. Recognizing this, when
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, they did so in order to resolve
the interests of the copyright owners as well as the cable providers.
Effectively, they “filled a gap by resolving disputes between copyright
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 70.
Id. at 75.
93
Id.
94
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976).
95
Id. (“[T]he Committee believes that cable systems are commercial enterprises whose basic
retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material and that copyright
royalties should be paid by cable operators to the creators of such programs.”).
96
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401–02 (1968).
91
92
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owners and cable operators for a little more than a decade while the
multichannel industry was developing [and] [a]s soon as relations between
[the two] stabilized . . . the industries migrated to a private . . . system of
negotiated settlements . . . .”97 The use of compulsory licenses was an integral
part of a developing industry, and that remains the case today regarding the
Internet broadcasting industry.
d. Economically Beneficial to Underdeveloped Companies
Compulsory licenses are beneficial to help strike a balance between
the competing interests of the service providers, the viewing public, and the
copyright-owning broadcast companies.98 The initial fee formulation of
section 111 was “not based upon any economic empirical data but [was]
hammered out in a last minute compromise between ‘the two industries most
directly affected by the establishment of copyright royalties for cable
television systems . . . .’”99 Seemingly, the initial compulsory license fees
were set at a rate that was below market standards “because small[] cable
systems may be less able to shoulder the burden of copyright payments than
larger systems.”100 This seemingly low fee permitted companies hoping to
capitalize on the broadcasting market a relatively low-risk entry, freeing up
their resources for other purposes, such as increased signal strength and
technological research and development.101
The compulsory license system was established for the benefit of
smaller companies entering into the broadcast television market, and for the
content providers to receive at least some, albeit minimal, compensation for
use of their works.102 Despite the fact that those cable and satellite companies
have now become more sophisticated,103 and can acquire licensing rights
through private contract negotiation,104 there are still smaller companies that
would tend to benefit from continued use of compulsory licenses. This
required minimal fee fosters innovative broadcasting technology and
methods, and encourages the growth of the methods by which viewers receive
their content. It not only compensates the copyright owners for use of their
works, but also encourages smaller companies to offer services that fit into
the copyright law.
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 70 n.3.
Garon, supra note 31, at 188.
99
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 297.
100
Id. at 297–98.
101
Id. at 306 (“An examination into the history of the development of the cable compulsory license
reveals a desire to give the infant cable industry a financial break so that it could afford the costly process
of laying cable.”).
102
Cate, supra note 75, at 222 (explaining that the initial compulsory license scheme served as a
subsidy for the infantile cable industry).
103
Id. at 220 (stating that the developments in the cable industry provided the service providers with
the ability to negotiate effectively and efficiently to carry programming).
104
Id. at 237.
97
98
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2. Abandoning Compulsory Licenses
In the time since its adoption, there has been continuous criticism of
the use of compulsory license statutes, namely that they are unconstitutional,
that the sophistication of cable companies has rendered their use
commercially obsolete, and that they are generally unsuccessful at
implementing the underlying public policies.105 While the arguments against
the use of compulsory licenses are not without merit, neither the courts nor
Congress have been convinced by them.106
a. Statutory Licenses are Categorically Unconstitutional
It has been suggested by some legal scholars that the use of
compulsory licenses is unconstitutional because it is completely adverse to
the grant of exclusive rights under the Copyright Clause.107 However, the
constitutionality of compulsory licenses has never been argued or addressed
in the courts, and therefore remains undecided.
The primary argument that compulsory licenses are unconstitutional
extends from the idea that by forcing copyright owners to allow third parties
certain limited rights through statute, the exclusivity of the bundled rights
granted under the Constitution are rendered meaningless.108 Simply put, by
operation of the statutory language, the 1976 Copyright Act revokes a
property right from the owner and gives it away for less than its fair market
value. The operative language of the Constitution109 serves to grant a limited
monopoly to copyright owners, and the pressing argument is “[t]he incentives
to attract private investment and further the creative endeavors of composers
are destroyed when anything less than an exclusive right is granted.”110 The
argument is that use of compulsory licenses undermines copyright law, and
directly conflicts with the intent of the Constitution to progress the useful arts
in granting limited monopolies in their works of authorship.111 Since the
rights that are granted under the copyright law are restricted by compulsory
licenses, they are no longer considered exclusive rights, making the incentives
received far less valuable.112
105
Bevilacqua, supra note 76, at 293–94; Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 69; Cate, supra note 75,
at 219–20.
106
Bevilacqua, supra note 76, at 293–94.
107
Id.; see also Bruce Schaffer, Are the Compulsory License Provisions of the Copyright Law
Unconstitutional?, 2 COMM. & L. 1, 2–3, 24 (1980).
108
Bevilacqua, supra note 76, at 293.
109
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
110
Bevilacqua, supra note 76, at 294 (citing Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary
Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1136–37
(1977)); see also U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
111
Bevilacqua, supra note 76, at 294.
112
Id. at 294 n.66, 295 (“If [a composer] takes less than the statutory fee . . . [i]t puts the composer in
a position where he can never ask for more than [the statutory fee], where he can never insist that his work
be recorded, but where he’s faced with the prospect that, if somebody is interested in recording, he will get
less [money] than the statutory fee.”).
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The constitutional challenge is unfounded, as “the copyright laws are
statutory, not derived directly from the Constitution.”113 Since the
Constitution only authorizes Congress to create a property right, it inversely
implies that Congress also has the authority to limit, broaden, change, or
abolish, the copyright law if it has a compelling interest to do so.114 Although
it remains to be seen whether or not a constitutional challenge to compulsory
licenses would succeed in a courtroom, the current trend and status would
likely uphold the use of compulsory licenses as constitutional.115
b. Statutory Licenses are Commercially Obsolete
Some commentators insist that since the service providers and
content providers have increased their use of private contract negotiations for
content delivery, the compulsory license is no longer necessary, and is
virtually commercially obsolete.116 The cable service providers of the 1960’s
“had established [their] viability in the marketplace,”117 but were still vastly
underdeveloped in comparison to modern cable and satellite providers.118
This lack of sophistication was found to be one of the supporting reasons for
implementing the compulsory license, finding that private negotiations
between all parties involved would simply be too burdensome on the cable
companies.119 By examining the historical development of the cable
compulsory license, it is clear that it resulted from a desire to provide the
infantile cable service industry with a financial break in order to establish their
service without breaking the bank.120 This is the same rationale that exists
with respect to the Internet television option.
Since the early days of the cable compulsory license, these cable
companies, and now satellite companies, have migrated into private contract
negotiations with broadcasting networks to acquire public performance rights
to broadcast copyrighted works.121 Cable and satellite companies, having
proven their viability in the marketplace, have grown into lucrative corporate
giants that are able to carry the burden of private contract negotiation, pay
higher fees, and negotiate for more than just what the basic compulsory

Fisch, supra note 25, at 414 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 3, § 1.07).
Id. at 415 (quoting Copyright Law Revision: Hearing on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 200 (1975)).
115
I introduce the two opposing sides of this argument as an illustration that there is skepticism as to
whether the implementation and continued use of compulsory licenses were initially within congressional
power. However, the status as of the date of this Comment is that compulsory licenses were exercised with
proper authority.
116
Cate, supra note 75, at 220; Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 306.
117
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 285.
118
Id. at 299.
119
Id. at 295 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976)).
120
Id. at 306.
121
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT
SECTION 109 REPORT 210 (2008), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/section109-final-report.pdf.
113
114
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license would permit.122 The development of the cable and satellite industries
over the course of the past 50 years “vitiates the underlying rationale for the
compulsory license.”123
The argument that the compulsory licenses are commercially obsolete
arose prior to the boom of the Internet.124 The rationale for implementing the
compulsory license system was ultimately rooted in providing
unsophisticated businesses a chance at establishing themselves as viable
competitors.125 The argument that using compulsory licenses are obsolete and
unnecessary due to the development of these industries,126 are unfounded as
the arguments proceed from the limited view that cable and satellite are the
only two available services. These arguments neglected to consider the
possibility of broadcasting taking on a new form. Since the Internet is
entering the broadcasting market and is competing with two very large and
sophisticated competitors, it would be beneficial to the consumer to have a
cost-effective content delivery option that would also allow the Internet
broadcasting companies to avoid copyright liability by providing some
compensation to the copyright owners. Internet broadcasting service
providers would also benefit as they could offer a market alternative, and
establish their position in the broadcasting industry.
c. Unsuccessful Implementation of Public Policies
Another argument for abandoning the use of “compulsory licenses [is
that they] have been less than successful in implementing public policy
goals.”127 The purpose of the copyright law is “to contribute to the public’s
benefit and to foster creativity and innovation.”128 Copyright law provides an
incentive for authors to create works of authorship and share those works with
the public in exchange for a limited monopoly and a bundle of rights to control
those works.129 The argument claims that compulsory license systems have
paled in comparison to the growing trend of private license negotiations, since
the industry has continued to develop.130
However, the compulsory licenses actually do implement public
policy by providing statutory guidelines for payment of royalties to copyright
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 304.
Id. at 305 (citing Copyright/Cable Television: Hearing on H.R.1805, H.R. 2007, H.R. 2108, H.R.
3528, H.R. 3530, H.R. 3560, H.R. 3940, H.R. 5870, and H.R. 5949 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 703 (1982) (statement of
Bernard J. Wunder, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Communication and Information, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce)).
124
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 121, at 23.
125
Id. at 122.
126
Swackhamer, supra note 75, at 305 (“The growth and prosperity of the cable industry vitiates the
underlying rationale for the compulsory license.”).
127
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 69.
128
Asaro, supra note 44, at 1111.
129
Id. at 1115.
130
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 77.
122
123
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owners.
Prior to their existence, the alternative was unauthorized
dissemination of others’ works without any form of royalty payments.131 The
form as it exists today reflects the public policy goals of copyright law by
providing compensation to copyright owners, while also encouraging
dissemination of works on a non-exclusive basis.132 It illustrates the quid pro
quo of intellectual property law exactly, just not in the most economically
favorable way. The growing trend may be to pursue private licensing
negotiations instead of acquiring a compulsory license, but that does not
minimize the importance of compulsory licenses. Compulsory licenses were
never meant as a substitute to privately negotiated licenses, but consequently
serve as a starting point for developing companies.133 The mere existence of
compulsory licenses encourages start-up companies to enter an industry and
operate legally rather than seek to do the same through improper means.
3. Rationale for Retaining, but Modifying Compulsory License Statutes
Compulsory licenses should remain a part of the Copyright Act. The
initial rationale for their adoption into the 1976 Copyright Act still rings true
today, but with minor differences. Internet broadcasting is still in its infancy,
and is entering a very established, sophisticated, and competitive market.
While it is still developing, compulsory licenses would provide Internet
broadcasting service providers with a form of a safety-net allowing them to
enter into the market without running the major risk of infringement lawsuits
originating from copyright owners.
Many broadcast companies feel that compulsory licenses limit their
exclusive rights.134 However, the compulsory licenses do provide the
broadcasting companies with a means of compensation for use, albeit a
minimal amount, without the burden of private contract negotiations. Even
still, the use of compulsory licenses does not bar either party from pursuing
private contract negotiations, but serves simply as a benchmark for newly
developing companies.135 If the Internet broadcasting industry is going to
survive, it is necessary to provide it the same benefits early cable and satellite
companies enjoyed by maintaining the use of compulsory licenses.136
131
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see also Standard
Music Roll Co. v. Mills, 241 F. 360 (3d Cir. 1917).
132
See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
133
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 70 (“[T]hese licenses should be viewed as interim arrangements
to preserve a balance between the extremes of full and no liability during periods of technological or other
change.”).
134
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
135
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 86 n.3 (“As soon as relations between broadcasters and cable
operators stabilized . . . the industries migrated to private law system of negotiated settlements under
‘retransmission consent’ statutory provisions.”).
136
It is recognized that individual broadcast companies may wish to offer their content through the use
of websites and mobile apps that would seemingly satisfy most viewers refusing to purchase cable and
satellite subscriptions. However, this model would not offer the same benefits of an Internet broadcasting
model that compiles the content of multiple broadcasters’ content in a single location. The Internet
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The initial justifications for implementing the compulsory license
system are centered on the concepts of enterprise development and
sustainability. They are put in place to provide a starting point for developing
business models, and without them, the underlying policies would not be
given actual effect. Without compulsory licenses, content providers will
continue to have a chokehold on the broadcast market, preventing the
development of alternative distribution models, and stagnating the
technological development of television. Arguments in favor of abandoning
compulsory licenses are not without merit. However, in the wake of
continued technological development, specifically regarding broadcasting
and electronics, it is far more favorable to the industry as a whole to retain at
least a foundational compulsory licensing scheme, and drafting it in such a
way that is more adaptable to change.
B. The Structure of Sections 111 and 119 Prevent Innovation
The policy goals that permeate copyright law include not only
providing incentives for authors to create original works of authorship, but
also encouraging the sharing of those works with the public.137 The benefit
compulsory licenses currently serve to developing technologies is vastly nonexistent. Broadcasting compulsory licenses come in only two forms: that of
cable systems and satellite systems.138 The introduction of Internet
broadcasting into this market challenges the narrowly drafted licensing
provisions, but has ultimately failed to be read into the statutory definitions.139
As a result, the potential next big innovation in broadcasting has been dealt a
heavy blow. Internet broadcasting companies are not afforded the same
benefits of the likes of cable and satellite services and are forced to develop
their model from a more difficult position. The language, drafted in such a
narrow fashion, thus prevents any innovative broadcasting service to enter the
market and compete fairly with well-established service providers. As a
result, the current structure of compulsory licenses acts to prevent innovation
instead of promoting it.
1. Definitional Language is Too Narrow
Cable provider compulsory licenses are described at length in section
broadcasting companies would effectively be able to siphon viewers away from these single-channel
website offers, but only because of the entire package they offer. The broadcasting companies would still
be permitted to offer their own works online, as some currently do today, but their model would likely not
be as appealing to the consumer who wants a one-stop-shop for their entertainment desires instead of
having to visit various websites to search for content.
137
Asaro, supra note 44, at 1114–15.
138
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 119 (2012).
139
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *21–22
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (“[N]othing in the Supreme Court’s opinion can be read as abrogating ivi because
the Supreme Court limited its holding to a finding that Aereo performs like a cable system for purposes of
the transmit clause, not that it is a cable system entitled to a § 111 license.”).
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111140 of the Copyright Act of 1976, while satellite provider compulsory
licenses flow from section 119.141 As far as television broadcasting is
concerned, these are the only two compulsory licenses from which to choose,
at the exclusion of other potentially viable broadcasting formats. As
illustrated by the fallout of the Aereo decision, the technical configuration of
an Internet broadcasting system cannot fit either of these definitions, and is
thus read out of the 1976 Act.
a. Section 111 Defines Cable Broadcasting Systems
as:

For the purposes of the 1976 Copyright Act, a cable system is defined
[A] facility[] . . . that in whole or in part receives signals
transmitted or programs broadcast by . . . broadcast stations
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and
makes secondary [re]transmissions of such signals or
programs . . . to subscribing members of the public who pay
for such service.142

Essentially it is a commercial subscription service that collects
broadcasted programs and makes them available to paying customers and
“consists of a central antenna which receives and amplifies . . . signals . . . to
the receiving sets of individual subscribers.”143 With cable providers, the
broadcasted signal and content is delivered through an existing network of
antennas, ground wires, amplifiers, and receivers in the possession of
individual subscribers.
On its face, Internet broadcasting companies are reflective of this
definition. In the case of Aereo, they received signals broadcast by the FCClicensed stations by using small antennae that were able to translate that signal
into computer-readable data, and thereafter transmitted through the
Internet.144 Their operation is very similar to that of a cable system, differing
only in the way that the content gets from point A to point B. However, courts
were unwilling to conclude that Internet television fits this definition to the
detriment of Internet broadcasting companies.145 Perhaps the rationale for
doing so is to force the hand of Congress to again wrestle with the language
of the 1976 Copyright Act and improve it to make it more applicable to the
17 U.S.C. § 111.
Id. § 119.
Id. § 111(f)(3).
143
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 88 (1976).
144
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014).
145
Aereo IV, No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014);
Keach Hagey, Copyright Office Denies Aereo Request to be Classified as Cable System, WALL STREET J.
(July 17, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/copyright-office-denies-aereos-bid-to-be-classedas-cable-system-1405616940.
140
141
142
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current and future technological instrumentalities.
b. Section 119 Defines Satellite Broadcasting Systems
Additionally, a satellite carrier is defined as:
[A]n entity that uses the facilities of a satellite or satellite
service licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission . . . to establish and operate a channel of
communications for point-to-multipoint distribution of
television station signals, and that owns or leases a capacity
or service on a satellite in order to provide such point-tomultipoint distribution . . . .146
Recognizing that satellite service providers operated through a fundamentally
different system of transmission and receipt of signals, Congress added this
section to the 1976 Copyright Act in order to accord satellite service providers
substantially the same licensing rights that cable service providers had held
since 1976.147 While there has been no recorded argument that Internet
broadcast television would fit under this definition, it is highly unlikely, given
that it cannot fit the definition of a cable system, that it would fit this definition
either. Given the technological foundation, and the single signal distribution
model, it can be deduced that Internet broadcast television simply differs too
much to ever fit this definition. Internet broadcast television is left with no
other lawful means of operation, short of burdensome private licensing
negotiations.
The definitions illustrate that Congress has, on two occasions,
modified the 1976 Copyright Act to account for innovation and to diversify
the broadcasting market. The Act defines the two existing service providers
in their own distinctive ways to the exclusion of other methods of
broadcasting recently developed. With such rigid construction, these
definitions act as a barrier to innovative technologies, rather than a nest egg.
c. No Section Defines Internet Broadcasting Systems
The language of the 1976 Copyright Act does not expressly provide
for a comparable licensing provision for Internet broadcasting, and as a result
is left unaccounted for. With these two types of broadcasting licenses
expressly written into the 1976 Copyright Act, an alternative model is
challenged to fit these definitions, or is found as infringing on public
performance rights.
Internet television’s best shot at being read into the copyright law
would have been under the definition of a cable system. Since the door is
146
147

17 U.S.C. § 119(d)(6).
Botein & Samuels, supra note 43, at 80.
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closed on that idea, Internet broadcasting is without an option because it is
highly unlikely that there is an argument that Internet broadcasting fits into
the definition of a satellite system. Without either definition at their disposal,
Internet television is without any avenues to legally perform their operation.
2. Language Structure Excludes Alternative Broadcasting Methods
The licensing structure currently as written provides for two
categories of content providers that are entitled to compulsory licenses.148 The
issue with this is that the technological foundations of television broadcasting
are shifting, and there is no room for these alternative methods to seek to
distribute content lawfully.149 Since it has been held that Internet broadcasting
business models violate content owner’s public performance rights by not
seeking a license,150 and because these businesses cannot seek a statutory
license,151 they are put at a significant disadvantage in the market place. On
a fundamental level, the technology driving Internet broadcasting technology
is materially different than that of the cable and satellite service providers.152
In fact, it is so different, that it does not fit the definition of either, and is
unfortunately excluded from acquiring lawful distribution license without a
huge financial burden.
a. Supreme Court’s Rationale in Aereo
In the recent Aereo III opinion, the Supreme Court mentioned
numerous times, and ultimately concluded that Aereo’s activities were
“highly similar to those of the CATV systems . . . that the 1976 amendments
sought to bring within the scope of the Copyright Act.”153 However, this
conclusion is not to be characterized as equating Aereo’s operation to that of
a cable system, unfortunately.154 The Court, in this instance, compared
Aereo’s operation to existing cable systems for the sake of deciding whether
or not they are “performing publicly” in violation of the 1976 Copyright Act,
and not to indicate whether they fit the statutory definition.155 The Court
concluded that Aereo’s practices are highly similar to the activities that the
1976 Copyright Act amendments sought to bring within the scope of the law–
–namely that they perform copyrighted works publicly without proper
authorization.156 As an Internet broadcasting service, Aereo was conducting
a service in a similar manner to other service providing companies by relaying
content between broadcasters and viewers. However, this statement made by
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 121, at 19.
Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).
Hagey, supra note 145.
See discussion infra Section III.B.2.d.
134 S. Ct. at 2511.
Id. at 2506.
Id. at 2507.
Id. at 2511.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol41/iss1/7

2016]

BECOMING UNPLUGGED

145

the Court was ultimately frivolous in aiding Aereo to continue to operate in
some capacity.
b. Aereo Subsequently Denied a License – Files Bankruptcy
In response to the Supreme Court’s opinion, Aereo argued on remand
that “in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Aereo III, it should be
considered a ‘cable system’ that is entitled to a compulsory license under §
111 of the Copyright Act . . . .”157 The District Court opined that this argument
“suffers from the fallacy that simply because an entity performs copyrighted
works in a way similar to cable systems it must then be deemed a cable system
for all other purposes of the Copyright Act.”158 They further explain that the
series of statements made in the Supreme Court’s opinion, stating Aereo’s
operation is similar to a cable system, is different than a judicial holding that
Aereo is in fact a cable system entitled to a compulsory license.159 Simply
put, the Supreme Court’s holding could not be characterized as reading
Internet broadcasting into the statutory language of section 111, and so the
District Court was not permitted to do just that. Thus, Aereo is not a cable
system entitled to a compulsory license. It has no other lawful means, short
of burdensome private contract negotiations, to conduct their operation
properly.
As a result, Aereo has abandoned ship.160 Its entire business was
premised on its subscription service, and without the ability to partake in that
business, Aereo was left in copyright limbo.161 The results from the Court’s
ruling, and the inability to obtain a compulsory license for failing to fit the
established definitions, had a detrimental effect to the prospect of this new
enterprise, and has limited consumer’s viewing options. This effect
contradicts the purpose and public policy goals of copyright law.162 Without
the operation of their primary revenue-generating service, Aereo was left with
no other choice but to file bankruptcy in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision.163 It is likely that any attempt to negotiate a license directly from
the broadcasting companies would either be futile, or out of their reasonable
price range, because they just do not have the same kind of market power to
generate the same revenue similar to Internet content delivery companies like
Netflix and Hulu.164
Aereo IV, No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *13 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 23, 2014).
Id. at 16–17.
159
Id. at 17–18.
160
Joe Mullin, After a 3-Year Copyright Battle, Aereo Gives Up the Ghost, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 21,
2014, 10:37 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/after-long-court-fight-aereo-files-for-bankr
uptcy/.
161
Geuss, supra note 11.
162
Asaro, supra note 44, at 1111.
163
Mullin, supra note 160.
164
Nate Anderson, Netflix Offers Streaming Movies to Subscribers, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2007,
11:02 AM), http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/01/8627/; NBC Universal and News Corp.
157
158
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With Internet broadcasting start-ups like Aereo out of the picture, the
cable and satellite providers will continue to rule the market, and maintain the
freedom to increase the price of their service. This effect goes against public
policy. The public performance right is supposed to encourage the
dissemination of authorship without fear of piracy, but denying a license to
which other models are entitled to only increases the control of certain parties
and prevents the free market from operating as intended. It harbors
monopolistic behavior and favoritism––one of the primary rationales for
implementing compulsory licenses in the first place.165 It places innovative
business models lacking sufficient negotiation power at a significant
disadvantage to models that have had over 50 years of dedicated development.
c. Section 111 was Never Intended to Extend to Internet
Additional support for denying a compulsory license to Aereo comes
from the Second Circuit, where, in WPIX v. ivi, Inc., the court concluded that:
the statute’s legislative history, development, and purpose
indicate that Congress did not intend for § 111 licenses to
extend to Internet retransmissions; . . . the Copyright Office’s
interpretation of § 111 -- that Internet retransmission services
do not constitute cable systems under § 111 -- aligns with
Congress’s intent and is reasonable . . . .166
If Congress had intended for section 111 to extend Internet
broadcasting, there would be language indicating that intent within section
111, or it would have codified a separate section specifically for Internet
broadcasting.167
Ultimately, the denial that Aereo is a cable system for purposes of
section 111 implies that the only way for Internet broadcasting compulsory
licenses to be effective is through legislation, and not judicial decree.168 The
current language is too rigid and narrow for innovative companies, such as
Aereo, to make a winning argument for their entitlement to a compulsory
Announce Deal with Internet Leaders AOL, MSN, Myspace and Yahoo! to Create a Premium Online Video
Site with Unprecedented Reach, HULU (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.hulu.com/press/new_video_venture.ht
ml [hereinafter NBC Universal and News Corp.]. Netflix and Hulu are similar companies in that they offer
various forms of content delivery. On the one hand, Netflix, which offers Internet streaming from a bank
of copyrighted works, was initially established as a mail movie-rental business that predicted the potential
of the Internet and built their model around it. Hulu, on the other hand, has a similar system to that of
Aereo, except it has a legal right to do so, as it was developed as a joint venture between broadcast
companies and Internet companies alike. While both of these systems are becoming supplementary to and,
at times, even substitutes for, cable and satellite packages, they were able to do so by developing alternate
revenue generating ventures and migrating their services into the Internet streaming market.
Unfortunately, companies like Aereo did not enter the market in the same way.
165
See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
166
691 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Aereo IV, No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150555, at *21 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 23, 2014).
167
Aereo IV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *16–18 (citing WPIX, Inc., 691 F.3d at 282).
168
Id.
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license. As deflating as that may be, it does illustrate the fact that Internet
broadcasting is materially different from the established broadcasting
methods. Perhaps the Court’s intention in ruling that Aereo publically
performed is their way of forcing the legislative hand to make the necessary
changes sooner rather than later. But without any change in the 1976
Copyright Act, Internet broadcasting companies will continue to be locked
out of the market and forced to partake in potentially costly private
negotiations for these rights.169
d. Internet Broadcasting Technology is Materially Different
Cable, satellite, and Internet television providers are similar in that
they offer paid subscription services permitting a viewer to access the
broadcast transmissions.170 But they differ in their levels of sophistication,
technological make-up, and stages of development. The first two service
providers have jointly developed sophisticated ways to work within the
allotted radio frequencies permitted for television, while simultaneously
resolving transmission issues.171 Technologically speaking, however,
Internet broadcasting operates through an entirely novel method of
delivery.172 The differences lie in how that transmission gets from point A to
point B without distorting quality.
Utilizing a network of ground wires and dish antennae, the cable
provider receives a signal either directly from a local antenna by wire, or from
a distant signal by a dish antenna, scrambles the signal, and then transmits the
scrambled information to consumers hooked into the network by coaxial or
fiber optic cables.173 However, this was not always the case. Broadcast
television was initially conducted through the use of radio wave, or analog
169
While the option of a negotiated license is not precluded by the operation of a compulsory license,
the realistic ability of a small start-up company such as Aereo to seek a negotiated license that is remotely
comparable to the larger cable and satellite service companies is pretty hard to imagine. The television
broadcast industry is driven by the viewer demand that is able to capture the large audiences to permit
commercial advertisements in order to generate revenue. Numerically speaking, in terms of viewership,
Internet broadcasting simply just does not have a powerful market share to be able to compete without a
subsidy.
170
Diallo, supra note 48.
171
Tricia Goss, Digital vs. Analog TV; What’s the Difference?, BRIGHT HUB (May 20, 2011), http://ww
w.brighthub.com/electronics/home-theater/articles/36552.aspx.
172
John Fuller, How Internet TV Works, HOW STUFF WORKS (Oct. 3, 2007), http://electronics.howstuff
works.com/internet-tv.htm; see also Competition Issues in Television and Broadcasting 2013, OECD 1,
27 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/TV-and-broadcasting2013.pdf (stating this novel method
altered the existing dynamic between traditional service providers and broadcasting companies, and is
posting a threat to the status quo).
173
How Cable Providers Operate, ENLIGHTENME, http://enlightenme.com/cable-providers/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016) (stating the scrambling of the signals permits the cable providers to compress signals
and ultimately transmit more content in significantly less space, increasing the amount of content they can
transmit over the fixed amount of allotted radio waves); Curt Franklin, How Cable Television Works, HOW
STUFF WORKS (Sept. 13, 2000), http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cable-tv.htm (illustrating that
MPEG compression allows the transmission of ten channels of video over a 6 megahertz bandwidth of a
single analog channel).
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transmission.174
This primitive broadcast model was riddled with
complications affecting the quality of the images and sounds.175 Throughout
the development of the cable industry, however, the providers were able to
navigate these signal transmission issues in new and innovative ways.176 The
cable providers were able to navigate the topography of the land by sending
their signals toward the sky to bring their signals to even more remote areas
of the country.
Much like cable network providers, satellite television resolves the
range and image distortion issues by transmitting their signals from satellites
orbiting the earth.177 Direct broadcast satellite providers acquire the broadcast
signals from the various sources and transmit those signals to the satellites in
orbit.178 The satellite dish in orbit aids in receiving and re-transmitting the
signal back down to the earth’s surface providing a clear, unobstructed signal
to a consumer with the proper equipment.179 Simply enough, the satellite
company operates very similarly to a cable network provider, except a
satellite provider does not provide a pre-existing network of hard wires into
which a consumer can plug; the “network” is contained in a subscriber’s own
home. The advantage behind satellite transmission is that it is an alternative
way of solving the line-of-site issue that troubled early cable companies.
Ultimately though, cable and satellite companies retain the control over the
content that they transmit to the subscribers through the use of licensing,
whether compulsory or privately negotiated.
Internet broadcast transmission is entirely different. It is without the
line-of-site issues that were problematic to cable and satellite providers, and
is thus less limited in both accessibility and content.180 Many different models
of Internet television are available to those who already have the necessary
hardware to receive the signal; namely an Internet connection.181 Instead of
an intricate maze of reflected radio signals and translation into binary code
for digital formatting, the Internet model intercepts the original transmission
as a group of information and immediately translates that information into
readable data, which is then “cast” over the Internet.182 This rids the
Goss, supra note 171.
Id.
176
Franklin, supra note 173. Primarily, the line-of-site issues were resolved first by lengthy cables
connected to antennas placed on high-points in a town that offered the most visibility, and therefore the
clearest reception. Id. Later, this issue was resolved by relaying the originally received signal off of
satellite dishes in orbit, receiving them at a single location, and then sending the combined signals to the
consumers. Id.
177
Karim Nice & Tom Harris, How Satellite TV Works, HOW STUFF WORKS (May 30, 2002),
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/satellite-tv1.htm.
178
Id.
179
Id. The shape of the satellite is in the form of a dish to help focus the transmission and reception of
signals, thus increasing the quality of the image and sounds. Id.
180
Fuller, supra note 172.
181
Id.
182
Id.
174
175
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transmission of the issues that plagued early cable and satellite companies.
With technological innovations like cloud storage, the consumer is
now benefitted with a host of viewing options that is fully customizable; a
trait not offered by cable and satellite services. The consumer now has access
to live broadcasts as well as on-demand programming, permitting consumers
to watch whenever or wherever they wish.183 Since the signal is carried to the
consumer as data and not as radio waves, the consumer can isolate singular
content and access programming from anywhere in the world without signal
interference issues, thus providing a level of customization and access
unprecedented in the broadcasting industry.184
Internet broadcasting is a good thing for the viewers and broadcasters
alike because it offers the consumer an alternative option to access content,
and increases the size of the audience for the broadcasters to reach. The
Internet has taken the choice of content out of the hands of network providers,
and given it to the consumer in a way that is fundamentally different from the
existing broadcasting forms.185 The manner in which copyrighted media is
consumed and thus the way it is broadcasted to mass quantities of people is
transforming.186
The significance of this new model of broadcasting is the difference
it strikes from existing broadcasting forms.187 Since content is becoming
increasingly available through the Internet, the subscribers or users of the
Internet model are given direct input regarding the content they wish to
receive.188 This takes the control of broadcasting content out of the hands of
the broadcasting companies and existing network providers and places it
directly into the hands of the consumer. Content can now consist of only what
a subscriber wishes to have access to, and not a predetermined bundle of
channels chosen by the network provider. The Internet has changed the
broadcasting power dynamic, and the consumer now has the upper hand.
3. Narrow Language Restricts Options for Innovative Technologies
The language of the compulsory license sections restricts the legal
options of innovative technologies, ultimately preventing their emergence
into an established market to test their own viability. By interpreting the
Id.
Id.
185
See Competition Issues in Television and Broadcasting 2013, supra note 172, at 27.
186
Id.
187
The level of customization and remote access is vastly different from the existing hard-wired
services offered by cable and satellite companies. Internet television has given rise to the concept of place
shifting, which allows a subscriber to enjoy their programming in more than just a single location, and on
their own schedule. This experience alone is not traditionally available with a standard hard-wired
subscription.
188
Fuller, supra note 172; Competition Issues in Television and Broadcasting 2013, supra note 172, at
27.
183
184
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language of the copyright compulsory licenses narrowly, the courts are
restricting the innovative capacity of technology to provide content in newer
delivery systems, like the Internet. If Internet broadcasting cannot be read
into the compulsory license language, there is little chance any other delivery
system will come close to doing so. The inability of Internet broadcasting to
be read into the existing compulsory license statutes permits the cable and
satellite industries to maintain their chokehold on the broadcasting industry.
Without any legislative action, Internet broadcasting companies are left with
limited options: risk infringement lawsuits from broadcasting companies, or
abandon their efforts.
To this point, a sufficient remedy to this issue that would support
Internet broadcasting companies still in their infancy to enter the television
services market is to alter the compulsory licensing language to include
Internet broadcasting, as well as other potential content delivery systems.
Instead of just defining Internet systems, a modification to these sections
should be based on the power of content control, rather than method of signal
distribution. This type of division, as opposed to the currently narrow
definitions of the various systems, anticipates the expansion of broadcast
services beyond what is currently comprehensible.
C. Change in Broadcasting Form Necessitates a Change in Compulsory
Licensing Language
As the methods of broadcasting continue to change, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that the compulsory licenses are ill-equipped to bring
those methods within the confines of the 1976 Copyright Act. The methods
are not only split on a technical level, but are divided by the concept of content
control and which party has the most of it. Since Internet broadcasting is
currently not afforded the same license as established service providers,189 it
is important to the survival of Internet broadcasting for compulsory licenses
to be significantly changed. If Congress is able to approach this division
categorically190 in attempting to redraft these licenses, then Internet
broadcasting may be brought into the boundaries of copyright law and
encouraged to prosper by operating legally.
1. Broadcasting Methods have Developed Beyond the Licensing Language
On a technical level, Internet broadcasting is fundamentally different
from the established methods of broadcasting.191 Despite this difference, an
attempt to harmonize Internet broadcasting with the rigid definitions has been
made, and was rejected by the courts.192 Conclusively then, it seems as if
189
190
191
192

See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
Cf. Asaro, supra note 44, at 1140.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.d.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.b.
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broadcasting technology and methods have evolved to a point unforeseen by
the drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act, and the subsequent drafters of the
compulsory license statutes. This evolution posits a new way of examining
the effectiveness of the definitions. Instead of thinking of service providers
by the hardware they use to receive signals, they should be thought of under
the model of who has control over their content,193 because that is currently
their most significant difference.
a. Active Content Delivery Systems – Technical Structure of
Cable and Satellite Services
The coined term “Active Content Delivery System” contemplates a
system in which the system itself is responsible for deciding which content a
subscriber may access.194 For example, larger companies like Dish Network
and Time Warner Cable often participate in negotiations regarding the
delivery of content, advertisement fees, and a whole host of other details that
go into the final version that the consumer enjoys. This give and take between
the broadcast companies like ABC and NBC, and the services providing
companies is a necessary precursor that dictates which content is allowed to
be transmitted and for what price.195 While the compulsory license may not
include the negotiation aspect of this relationship, the relationship itself is
indicative of who has the power to control the content the viewer receives,
namely the service provider. They actively participate in the choosing of
content.
b. Passive Content Delivery Systems – Technical Structure of
Internet Broadcasting
Another coined term, “Passive Content Delivery System”
contemplates a system in which the viewer is in complete control of their
experience, but only utilizing the system’s infrastructure as a means to an end.
Instead of the service provider making choices about which content is going
to be offered to the consumer, the consumer makes deliberate decisions about
which content to access, and the Passive Content Delivery System does the
leg-work of isolating the content to deliver it to the consumer. The Passive
Content Delivery Systems are those that are operated in response to user input
rather than large-scale distribution of signals.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.d.
Typically, the broadcasting companies and the service providers partake in a negotiation for what
is called carriage licenses. These licenses, among other things, stipulate which signals the service provider
can transmit from the broadcasting company to the subscriber on the other end. It is through this
negotiation that the service provider takes an active role in deciding which content is made available to the
consumer, and for what price. If no agreement is reached, generally, the service provider is not permitted
to carry a certain signal. Cable Carriage of Broadcast Stations, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.
gov/guides/cable-carriage-broadcast-stations (last updated Aug. 15, 2013).
195
See id.
193
194
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c. Cable and Satellite Services are Bridging the Gap Between
Content Delivery Systems
Both cable and satellite providers are migrating into the Internet
broadcasting models, and developing their own content delivery systems that
reinforce the reality of this needed change; their own delivery systems support
the need for reevaluating the statutory language. For example, Hulu was
created as a joint venture between Comcast and AOL.196 Their innovative
way of delivering content is a way of circumventing the content-owner and
content-provider negotiations and just delivering the content to the consumer.
However, Hulu accomplishes this in a way that is indicative of this model of
content control; the user picks which program they wish to watch, and only
that program is transmitted.197 If Hulu were an independent company, like
Aereo, they would be the poster-child of a passive broadcasting system, and
be entitled to whatever corresponding licensing scheme is in place.
2. Existing Broadcasting Methods are Categorically Distinguishable
As it currently stands, the narrowly drafted compulsory license
statutes provide definitions for only two types of content delivery systems, to
the exclusion of other developing systems.198 Technological innovation
developed beyond the boundaries of the copyright law, gives rise to things,
such as: digital recording and playback, cloud storage, and Internet
television.199 But these technological advances differ greatly from the initial
design of television broadcast, which necessitates a more categorical
approach to fitting these developments within copyright law.
a. Active Content Delivery Systems are Similar Enough for
Categorization
The Active Broadcasting Delivery systems on a technical level are
similar, and therefore should be afforded similar compulsory licensing
language that reflects their similarity. As illustrated above, the way in which
cable and satellite companies acquire and transmit their signals, as well as the
way they charge their subscribers is strikingly similar.200 Their technological
similarity would support a categorical approach to redefining the compulsory
licenses.
Additionally, the Passive Content Delivery Systems are distinct
enough from Active Content Delivery Systems to establish their own category
regarding licensing. They may receive signals in similar fashion to those of
196
197
198
199
200

See NBC Universal and News Corp., supra note 164.
About Hulu, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
Asaro, supra note 44, at 1109.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012), with 17 U.S.C. § 119.
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the Active Content Delivery Systems, but because of the level of control over
the content they provide to their subscribers, their system operates
differently.201 Instead of a multitude of transmitted signals from broadcaster
to consumer that is predetermined, they may only collect a single isolated, or
range of, frequencies and translate that information to data for distribution to
the consumers. This ability to determine exactly what content is accessed will
permit a more accurate accounting for the distribution of collected licensing
fees, and aid broadcasting companies in making more informed decisions
about which content to acquire and broadcast. The exciting part about this
categorical approach is that it would allow Internet broadcast television to
experiment with different effective ways of making the content accessible to
the consumer without offending the copyright owner’s rights.
3. Proposal of Solutions
Since the Court’s ruling in Aereo, there has been some speculation on
what should happen next. Most can agree that the most effective way to
remedy the outcome of this case is by some form of legislative action or
regulation.202 While other scholars have opined on a solution,203 and the FCC
has since considered proposing new rules to fit Internet television into the
compulsory licensing definitions,204 this Comment seeks to propose an
alternative; redraft the broadcast compulsory licenses to reflect a more
categorical approach to innovative methods of broadcasting. Namely, instead
of defining the different systems of broadcasting, the methods of content
delivery should be defined categorically, as to include future innovative
methods.
a. Rewrite the Licensing Statutes to Reflect the Technical Division
of Methods
The language of the compulsory license statutes of the 1976
Copyright Act should be rewritten to reflect new categorical bifurcation.
Instead of the broadcast compulsory licenses reflecting the means by which
the content is provided to the consumer, the compulsory licenses should be
reflective of who has control over the content, namely “Passive Content
Delivery System” and “Active Content Delivery System.” The standard
definitions of these suggested compulsory licensing revisions would reflect

See discussion supra Section III.B.2.d.
See Aereo IV, No. 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *23 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 23, 2014)
(quoting WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 2012)); Asaro, supra note 44, at 1140.
203
Asaro, supra note 44, at 1140.
204
Jacob Kastrenakes, Huge FCC Rule Change Could Make Internet TV a Reality, VERGE (Oct. 28,
2014, 5:15 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/28/7086201/internet-tv-rule-change-proposed-fcc;
Tom Wheeler, Tech Transitions, Video, and the Future, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (Oct. 28, 2014, 2:48
PM), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/tech-transitions-video-and-future.
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the definitions illustrated in the previous section.205
One of the concerns may be the collection of the statutory fees, and
how they should be calculated. The suggested form of the compulsory license
can take a similar form from the already existing compulsory licenses to
calculate fees and royalties paid, and would be more inclusive of developing
technologies. A formula for calculating the proper royalty can be configured
utilizing the number of subscribers, the number of views of a given program,
and how often a subscriber uses the services to access content.206 Since
Internet relies on storable data for the transmission of the content, it is
reasonable to believe that data can be used to track the precise number of
views from a precise number of subscribers, ultimately providing a more
accurate accounting of the royalties that should be paid under the statutory
definition.
b. Benefits of this Solution
A wider scope of licenses will account for content delivery systems
yet to be developed, such as mobile content delivery systems, for example,
which will prove to be mutually beneficial to both content owners and content
distributors. Setting a wider scope on the broadcasting methods that would
fall into the purview of copyright law will provide assurance to copyright
owners that the use of their works is compensated, and unauthorized
performance of those works will be reprimanded. Similarly, content
providers will have a better idea of where their developing technologies will
fall with respect to the royalties they would have to pay.
With this categorical approach, an innovative company breaking into
the broadcasting market will know that their model will fall into one of two
groups, that they must seek the minimum license and pay the content owners,
and that the threat of future copyright infringement litigation is minimized.
This will continue to encourage the Active Content Delivery Systems to
develop alternative methods, by which they could also capitalize on
opportunities presented in the Passive Content Delivery Systems. Overall, a
categorical approach, such as this suggested approach, will prove to be more
inviting of technological innovation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of compulsory licenses in the broadcasting world remains
relevant, as new forms of broadcasting are beginning to emerge. Taking that
into consideration, something needs to be done to allow these developments
to grow and test their viability in an established market. While Congress is
See discussion supra Section III.C.1.
17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012) (describing the calculation of the royalty rates); 17 U.S.C. § 119(b)–(c)
(describing the process of maintaining a license and the royalty rates).
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likely to sit on its hands regarding copyright, as changing the copyright law
is likely not on its radar in this modern era of congressional stagnation,
perhaps the FCC’s proposed rules will provide an effective remedy by simply
being more inclusive of developing technologies. However, it will remain to
be seen whether these regulations are adequate in the context of copyright
law. Ultimately, some form of revision is imperative to resolve this issue
before it spins out of control, whether it be regulatory solutions, or Internet
broadcasting lobbyists increasing their presence in Washington to convince
Congress to make the changes it needs.
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